Beyond the Myth of Nationality: Analyzing Networks within the European Commission by Suvarierol, S. (Semin)
Beyond the Myth of Nationality: Analyzing 
Networks within the European Commission  
SEMIN SUVARIEROL∗  
 
The current literature on the European Commission refers to the influence of 
nationality in the functioning of the Commission and in particular to the reliance on 
networks based on nationality, failing to give much evidence apart from anecdotes. 
This empirical study takes a systematic approach by applying concepts from 
organizational network analysis to examine the networking patterns of Commission 
officials and to explore the effect of nationality therein. The data clearly show that 
nationality is not a significant factor in shaping officials’ task-related informal 
networks. While variables related to nationality and socialization fail to explain the 
variation, the size of the member-state in terms of the amount of officials it has and 
whether the contacts occur within the Directorate-General determine whether an 
official relies on compatriots for information and advice. The organizational structure 
of the Commission renders nationality irrelevant for its daily work.  
 
By the nature of their composition, nationality is a salient factor within international 
organizations. On the one hand, member-states demand to be represented within 
these organizations through their citizens; on the other hand, the same organizations 
are expected to be independent, i.e. to have an international outlook free of national 
influences. The need for representation is both linked to the question of legitimacy 
and to making successful policies taking the national circumstances into account. 
The need for independence in turn stems from the desirability of assuring an 
overarching global interest for all member-states. International organizations need to 
deal with this dilemma1 starting with the recruitment of their officials. The United 
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Nations (UN) has been the first to formally acknowledge this dilemma by embedding 
the “recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible” and “not seeking or 
receiving instructions from any government or from any other authority” principles 
into its Charter (Claude 1971: 193). The European Commission has followed suit by 
endorsing and applying them both to its College of Commissioners (through the 
treaties) and to its officials (through its staff regulations). 
 Career aspects, however, are just one facet of the nationality issue within an 
international bureaucracy. Personnel management within a multinational context has 
challenges of its own as the diverse cultural backgrounds of officials might be seen 
as a barrier to creating a common working culture (Claude 1971: 192; Mazey and 
Richardson 1996: 419; McLaren 1997: 57-59; Page 1997: 97) or because the 
working culture might be “cross-cut and fractured by particularistic attachments and 
cultures” (Nugent 2000: 297) as has been argued for the case of the Commission. 
The European Commission is not only the largest of the EU institutions, but it 
is unique among international organizations for its exclusive formal competence to 
initiate and draft EU legislation (Hooghe 2005: 863). Simultaneously, what makes the 
Commission an interesting institution to study from an organizational perspective is 
that its formal organizational structure makes it less likely for nationality and national 
attachments to play a role. Comparable to national ministries, the Commission is 
divided into Directorate-Generals (DGs) reflecting sectors or functions instead of 
being divided into territorial or national components (Egeberg 2004).2 Furthermore, 
the geographical balance principle is applied from the bottom to the top, starting with 
the multinational composition of units to avoid national enclaves (ibid: 212). 
Setting up a formal structure based on the multinationality ideal, however, is 
only one side of the story. Ethnographic studies have shown that most bureaucratic 
organizations tend to develop messy yet successful informal sectors that follow very 
different cultural codes and principles beneath the external appearance of order and 
formality (Shore 2000: 207). It is this informal culture of the Commission that has 
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been at the origin of the reference to national influences, clubs, and networks. It has 
been argued that these national networks provide instrumental functions such as 
exchange of information, contacts with more influential compatriots in and outside the 
Commission, and political opinionating (Hooghe 1999: 415). 
Indeed, the idea of compatriots seeking and supporting compatriots seems 
plausible. As organizational network theory asserts, people interact more with their 
own kind, that is with people similar to themselves (what has been termed 
homophily), and this basic human tendency structures network ties of every type, 
from marriage and friendship to work, advice, support and information transfer 
(McPherson et al. 2001). But how about the networks of Commission officials? Are 
national networks a myth or everyday reality?  
This article assesses whether European Commission officials are homophilic 
in terms of their networks. Put differently, do Commission officials have national 
networks and how can this be explained? While answering this question, this study 
moves beyond the current literature which confines itself merely to stating that 
networks are key to the functioning of the Commission (Hooghe 1999, Shore 2000, 
Stevens and Stevens 2001), and that they are partly shaped by nationality (Egeberg 
1996: 731; Hooghe 1999: 405; Laffan 2004: 90; Shore 2000: 199). The concept of 
networks is defined and deconstructed, and a differentiation is made between task-
related (formal and informal), career, and leisure networks. The task-related informal 
networks are in turn singled out to analyze whether and how nationality plays a role 
in shaping Commission officials’ networking behavior. The research is based on 
original empirical data consisting of 82 interviews with Commission policy officials of 
four Commission DGs between April-June 2005. The analysis derives from both the 





Putting the Effect of Nationality into Perspective  
The role of national origins and culture within the European Union is a popular theme 
in the European integration literature. Michelle Cini (1996: 125) has argued that 
national affiliation remains a fundamental characteristic of internal Commission 
affairs, in spite of the non-nationalistic vision of the EU set out by the founders of the 
European Commission. It has been observed that the convergence that results from 
a common professional experience does reduce national identification to a certain 
extent and brings distance to relations with the native state (Bellier 1995: 60), but that 
individuals are notably still conscious of their differences and sensitivities (Abélès 
and Bellier 1996: 435). The assumption is, “However open-minded, flexible and 
adaptable an official may be, … background matters because he or she will bring into 
work at least some of the values, presuppositions and habits that have been acquired 
in early life.” (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 116)  
The core issue here is not that officials have different backgrounds, which is a 
given, but that the differences are perceived to be influential on the behavior of 
officials from different backgrounds, and that these perceptions “can feel empirically 
true” (Abélès et al. 1993: 42, McDonald 2000: 66). To manage these differences, 
officials tend to make assumptions about each other that emphasize such diverging 
characteristics (Page 1997: 87). Such assumptions involve national stereotyping 
among a significant proportion of officials, which especially come to the fore during 
times of stress (Michelmann 1978: 494). One blatant example of this was when the 
Jacques Santer Commission (1995-1999) had to resign due to allegations of fraud 
and nepotism. In particular, Edith Cresson (then the French Commissioner 
responsible for Science, Research, and Development) was accused of favoritism 
involving the appointment of several associates to well-paid positions in the 
Commission.   
[M]any Commission officials agreed that Cresson had been victim of an ‘Anglo-Saxon 
political crusade’ and deplored the way the ‘Germans had joined the [N]ortherners in 
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a Protestant crusade against the [S]outhern culture of state administration’. As 
Cresson declared, much to the embarrassment of her colleagues, she was ‘guilty of 
no behavior that is not standard in the French administrative culture’ (Shore 2000: 
202). 
Even though the EU bureaucracy is relatively culturally homogenous compared to, 
for instance, the UN Secretariat, as the example above demonstrates, the differences 
between the North and South have been often cited as a dividing line (Abélès et al. 
1993; Beyers and Dierickx 1997, 1998; Egeberg 1996; Hofstede 1994; Mc Donald 
2000), where Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, and Sweden constitute the Northern group, and Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain the Southern.3  
Arguably, the North-South division influences how officials behave in the 
Commission. Culturally, Northerners are taken to be well-adapted to the rational, 
impersonal Weberian forms of bureaucracy, whereas Southerners are assumed to 
link loyalties and virtues to personal or patron-client type obligations (Egeberg 1996: 
727; McDonald 2000: 67-68). To take the example of the issue of information flow, 
the Northern officials have been observed to complain of the lack of readily shared 
information in the Commission, whereas Southerners are said to find it simple to 
obtain information by making friends (McDonald 2000: 67).  
The foregoing examples are not insignificant observations about life in the 
multinational administration of the Commission. Yet, for these observations to 
become practically significant for scholars of public administration and policy studies, 
the question has to be answered as to how these differences influence the behavior 
of administrators when it comes to their substantive work to be able to analyze 
whether this eventually has any consequences for policy-making. This is why 
nationality and national differences have to be put into perspective by looking into the 
organizational context of the Commission.    
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Such an organizational approach has been brought into the European 
integration literature primarily by Morten Egeberg (2001, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). While 
acknowledging the fact that Commission officials are pre-packed with national 
experiences, norms, and values, he argues: “Although these personal attitudes may 
be seen as some sort of paradigm, belief system or conceptual lens that might 
somehow make a difference in a given decision situation, they are, nevertheless, of a 
relatively general nature. To become relevant in a given decision context, they have 
to be operationalized and pass several potential organizational filters.” (Egeberg 
2004: 212).  
As aforementioned, the organizational structure of the Commission reflects 
closely that of a national administration where DGs are the ministries, each with its 
own policy area or function. The DG attachment is particularly important for 
understanding the actual decision behavior of Commission officials (Cram 1994; Cini 
1996a, 2000a; Egeberg 1996, 2004b, 2006c). The fact that the posts of officials are 
organized according to purpose and function makes it less likely that officials will 
focus on territorial (national) concerns (Egeberg 2004: 212-213). Moreover, in order 
to avoid national clusters, units are multinationally composed and staff immediately 
above and below a given senior post are of a different nationality.  
Still, “Formal relations coordinate roles or specialized activities, not persons.” 
(Selznick 1957: 8). This is why nationality can still be expected play a role in contrast 
to or simultaneously with the formal role expectations, especially in areas where 
formal tasks and obligations leave leeway for individual fulfillment. It is when 
individuals use informal channels to conduct their formal tasks that the informal 
becomes relevant for the performance of an employee and in turn for the functioning 





Studying Networks in the Commission by Bringing in Organizational Network 
Theory  
Having access to the right information at the right time is vital, especially for 
conducting knowledge-intensive work such as professional services which requires 
employees to solve complex problems within short time horizons (Cross and Borgatti 
2004: 137). For the most part, such issue-specific and problem-centered information 
is in individuals’ heads, since “specialization (among other factors) ensures that each 
individual maintains different bundles of knowledge.” (Cross et al. 2001: 216)  
When people are the only way to get information that matters (Cross and 
Borgatti 2004: 137), connections to other colleagues become very valuable. This is 
the underlying idea behind networks as social capital (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 
993). An individual’s social capital consists of their personal network and their 
chances of accessing whatever is circulating there, e.g. information (Cross and 
Parker 2004: 11). Accordingly, “whom you know has a significant impact on what you 
come to know, because relationships are critical for obtaining information, solving 
problems, and learning how to do your work” (idem). As such, personal networks are 
an important factor in an employee’s performance within an organization (idem). This 
is why it is of particular interest to look into the networking behavior of individuals in 
organizations. 
Stevens and Stevens (2001: 177) underline the value of information within the 
policy-making processes of the Commission and argue that information is a key 
resource in daily relationships within this organization. Information flow constitutes an 
important informal aspect of power relationships in the Commission (Abélès et al. 
1993: 6). Consequently, it becomes a tool both for incorporating and excluding 
colleagues. “The Commission is riven with internal divisions and inclined to habits 
which prevent the free flow of information and ideas.” (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 
243) In such a system, key personal contacts become vital for building support and 
alliances within the fixed deadlines (ibid: 178).  
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Before going on with a further discussion, it is fundamental to offer a clear 
definition of the concept of networks since it is one of those concepts commonly used 
without specification of what it exactly implies. Networks are taken here as the 
“personal contacts within the context of organizational contacts” (Jönsson and 
Elgström 2005: 3). As such, they are complementary to formal hierarchical channels 
that are set by the hierarchical division of labor and formal rules and procedures in an 
organization. Whereas hierarchical channels are used for task-oriented formal 
communication, networks come into play to fill in the gaps or to make up for the 
inefficiencies of the hierarchical channels. James March and Herbert Simon even 
argue that “formal hierarchical channels tend to become general-purpose channels to 
be used whenever no special-purpose channel or informal channel exists or is known 
to the communicator’’ (March and Simon 1958: 167-168). Networks involve a 
relationship of mutual exchange and dependency and usually remain highly informal 
and to a degree invisible (Morgan 1986: 174). Networking may occur over the 
telephone, through old-boy networks and other friendship groups, through informal 
meetings, or through chance contacts (idem). “The informality of networks rests on 
the personal relationships that develop as a result of frequent interaction.” (Elgström 
and Jönsson 2005: 3) 
Networks are central to understanding the way the Commission works in 
practice (Shore 2000: 200). Liesbet Hooghe refers to some nationalities in the 
Commission having a strong reputation of clubness, which she defines as “a set of 
formal and informal networks within which members tend to act in concert” (Hooghe 
1999: 405). Hooghe argues further that officials with weak national networks are at a 
disadvantage, as successful policy-making in the EU often depends on the quality of 
intelligence (ibid: 415).  “Access to information can create a form of power parallel to 
the official hierarchies and sometimes much more efficient than them.” (Abélès et al. 
1993: 57-58) 
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In their study of the communication networks of national officials within 
European Council working groups, Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx (1997: 436) found 
nationality to be a major factor when negotiators have to select partners to forge 
informal communication links with. Moreover, they tend to view their partners in terms 
of larger ‘regions’ (ibid: 465). The results of their study showed that Northern 
negotiators communicated more with other North Europeans, and South Europeans 
were more attached to each other than to North Europeans (ibid: 437). The influence 
of nationality within the Council setting is perhaps not so puzzling since the officials 
are expected to represent their nation-states there. It is more intriguing to look into 
the networks of Commission officials, where nationality is not supposed to play a role 
due to the Commission’s sectoral organizational structure. In turn, one would expect 
officials to have supranational intra-organizational4 networks, maintaining contacts 
with all member-state officials. Is this the case or do officials rely on their national 
intra-organizational networks, predominantly contacting officials of their own 
nationality? 
In order to be able to answer this question, the concept “network” needs to be 
specified further. This deconstruction is not new to organizational network analysis. 
Daniel Brass (1984: 519) refers to the existence of three types of social networks 
within organizational structures as the workflow, communication, and friendship 
networks. I apply this tri-partite division to the Commission as follows: 
1) Task-related formal network:  formal contacts dictated by the official’s task 
description and obligations 
2) Task-related informal network: informal contacts used to conduct one’s tasks 
3) Leisure network: contacts during social activities and gatherings which fall outside 
working hours and obligations. 
In the case of the Commission, the fieldwork leads me to propose adding a fourth 
type: 
4) Career network – contacts maintained for one’s own career advancement.   
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The theoretical expectations and the pilot interviews conducted with 
Commission officials to fine-tune the questionnaire utilized for this study led to 
making the task-related informal networks the primary focus for studying the effect of 
nationality on shaping the intra-organizational networks of Commission officials. The 
reasoning behind is as follows: 
• The task-related formal networks of Commission officials are hierarchically 
defined. There is no choice element involved here, so the organizational 
structure and formal responsibilities are the factors that determine these 
networks. Accordingly, nationality is by default not an explanatory factor here 
since these contact persons are pre-defined.  
• There is no direct link between the pure leisure and career networks and 
policy-making processes within the Commission. These networks are a case 
apart. This does not exclude the possibility of using these contacts also for 
work purposes. Whether these contacts are activated for substantive work-
related issues is conditioned, however, by the relevance of these contact 
persons to the official’s work.  
The task-related informal networks, however, are where the formal and the 
informal merge. Moreover, the information and advice obtained through these 
networks have a direct effect on an official’s performance and simultaneously on the 
functioning of the policy-making process in the Commission. I therefore argue that 
these are the most crucial networks for testing the effect of nationality. 
I refer here to information that is not directly accessible through the formal 
channels, such as the intranet and official mailing lists. This is the kind of information 
one can usually only obtain through personal contacts, with the aim of receiving 
complementary information such as background information on an issue, 
analysis/interpretation of a problem, and advice on how to proceed with a given 
situation. When the issue at hand involves another DG or unit, this information might 
also merely be figuring out what is going on in the other DG since this information is 
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not readily available until a draft proposal reaches a certain stage of maturity. These 
are mainly the types of information and advice which enable an official to build on 
what is formally available. 
On the whole, informal practices require a measure of trust and a faith in 
commonality (Middlemas 1995: 680). “Similarity breeds connection.” (McPherson et 
al. 2001: 415) This principle, formulated by Aristotle simple as “[people] love those 
who are like themselves” (Quoted in ibid: 416), is called ‘homophily’ in social 
network research. Homophily is a simple principle which asserts that contact 
between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (ibid: 
416). This principle rests on experimental literature in social psychology that 
established that attitude, belief, and value similarity lead to attraction and interaction 
(ibid: 428). Interacting with similar others is efficient as it facilitates transmission of 
tacit knowledge, simplifies coordination, and avoids potential conflicts (Borgatti and 
Foster 2003: 999). Crude as it may be, network research has shown that the 
homophily principle structures network ties of every type (McPherson et al. 2001: 
415) 
An interesting result of homophily research is that the strongest effect of 
homophily occurs with regard to race and ethnicity on a wide range of relationships 
from the most intimate bonds of marriage to work relations, networks of discussion 
about a particular topic, and “knowing about” someone else (ibid: 420). Furthermore, 
many facets of ethnicity (e.g., mother tongue, national origins, ethnic group, and 
region of birth) also display this characteristic (idem). Research on multi-national 
companies is a case in point: “People in different countries preferred to interact with 
others of the same nationality.” (Cross and Parker 2004: 16) Moreover, nationality is 
an easy characteristic to assess in comparison to personality and abilities (Pratt 
2001: 25).  
In this sense, the homophily theory forms a basis rationale to test the 
argument that Commission officials will generally try to deal, at least in the first 
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instance, with people from the same country or from the general geographic area 
(Page 1997: 136; Stevens and Stevens 2001: 180). The first step in finding out 
whether Commission officials rely on similar others for information or advice is to 
answer the question ‘Who do Commission officials contact?’.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Officials rely relatively more on officials with the same 
nationality for information or advice. 
Hypothesis 2:  
a) North European officials rely relatively more on other officials from 
the North, and South European officials with others from the South for 
information or advice.  
b) South European officials rely relatively more on officials with the 
same nationality than North European officials.  
Hypothesis 3: Officials communicate relatively more with officials who speak 
their native language for obtaining information or advice. 
 
To test these hypotheses, the contacts with similar others in terms of nationality-
related variables have been counted to see what their sheer numbers reveal in terms 
of the networking patterns of Commission officials. This analysis has been followed 
by an explanation of these results. 
 
Research Design and Methodology  
The research questions have been answered by means of interviews with policy-
making, that is Administrator level (A-level)5 European Commission officials. The 
interviews contained both structured and open questions derived from the literature 
and exploratory pilot interviews. To get the most interesting results with this number 
of informants, the study was limited to one policy area. Four DGs belonging to the 
“Social Regulation”6 family have been included in the sample:  
 12
‐ Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, 
‐ Environment, 
‐ Health and Consumer Protection,  
‐ Justice, Freedom, and Security. 
Regulatory DGs are theoretically interesting since the EU is considered to be a 
‘regulatory polity’ (Majone 1996). Methodologically, obtaining a high response rates is 
crucial, and reducing the respondents’ burden is one of the main factors that 
influence the response rate (Lohr 1999: 261). At the time of sampling, this group of 
DGs employed a total of 1100 A-level officials, more or less equally distributed 
across the DGs. This was an important factor in terms of distributing respondent 
burden across DGs. Reducing the respondents’ burden is one of the crucial factors 
that influence the response rate (Lohr 1999: 261).  
 Since the DG belonging is the central variable to test the effect of 
organizational structure, it is vital to ensure an adequate representation of all the 
DGs to allow comparison between the DGs. To obtain a real “miniature of the 
population” that reflects the population with respect to the size of the DGs, the 
sampling technique that has been used is a type of stratified random sampling called 
proportional allocation (Lohr 1999: 104).  Proportionate stratified sampling, typically 
results in more precise survey estimates by reducing sampling error (Edwards et al. 
1997: 58-59).  
 The online Commission directory was utilized to compose the list of the 
population of officials from which a random sample of 120 officials has been drawn.  
A proportionally equal number of officials were thus randomly selected within each 
DG. The interviews were conducted within the span of a total of five weeks, during 
the two periods between 5-22 April 2005 and 23 May-3 June 2005. The resulting 
overall response rate (out of 118 officials7) was 69%, i.e. 82 officials, which is 
considered to be a very good response rate (Babbie 1992: 267). Item non-response 
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rate was very low: Only one of the 82 officials only responded to half of the survey 
questions and was excluded from most of the analyses. The results of the 
quantitative part of the survey were analyzed using the statistical software package 
SPSS 12.0.1. 
First, some background information on the officials has been gathered to 
account for potential explanatory factors that determine the shape of an official’s 
network, based on the studies and questionnaires of Beyers and Dierickx (1997, 
1998), Hooghe (2001), and Trondal (2001). These elements included multinational 
family background and experience, command of foreign languages, past work 
experience (in national or international organizations), and length of service.  
In social network analysis, a network is a set of actors connected by a set of 
ties. A single focal actor is called an “ego” and the set of actors that ego has ties with 
are called “alters”. The ensemble of ego, his alters, and all ties among these 
(including those to ego) is called an ego-network (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 992). 
Since ego-networks can be collected for unrelated egos, ego-network studies blend a 
network-theoretic perspective with the conventional, individual-oriented methods of 
collecting and processing data (ibid).  
To obtain the network of each official, the respondents were asked to reflect 
upon the officials they regularly turn to for information or advice, specifying that this 
does not (necessarily) involve the officials they have to contact due to their task 
description and obligations. The respondents have then been asked to select the 
three officials8 they considered to be the most important for conducting their policy-
making work. The interviews focused subsequently on the attributes of and 
relationship with these three contact persons.  
The structured interview questions were followed up by open questions 
concerning networks in the Commission, such as how Commission officials build 
their networks and more importantly to what extent, how, and why their networks 
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affect policy-making processes. This qualitative data has been recorded, and the 
recorded material and the notes of the interviews have been transcribed.  
 
National Networks in a Multinational Organization? 
When openly asked whether nationality or culture has an effect on the networks of 
Commission officials, 57.3% of the interviewed officials said nationality and 61% of 
them said culture mattered.  Commission officials acknowledge that it is easier to 
establish contacts with officials from their own nationality (Officials #2, #22). The 
contacts with compatriots are more spontaneous (Official #76) and smooth (Official 
#82). This is mainly due to the simple fact that they “speak to each other in their own 
language and share the same cultural references” (Official #69). The communication 
is therefore faster and easier since they understand each other quicker (Officials #75, 
#76, #119). You know how to approach someone from your own country (Official 
#87), and you are more open to help a compatriot when approached (Official #17). 
You also have higher expectations of obtaining an answer or a favor when 
approaching a compatriot (Official #22). These aspects of same nationality contacts 
do indeed point to the advantages of speaking with someone of your own kind. 
Consequently, Commission officials might have well been homophilic if cultural 
commonalities would determine their communication patterns.  
The quantitative network evidence, however, strongly refutes this argument: 
Only 17.8% of the contact persons are of the same nationality. The average of same 
nationality contacts is 0.53 out of the maximum possibility of three. At the opposite 
end, 49 of the 81 officials have no same nationality contacts, i.e. 60.5% of the 
officials have a purely multinational network which does not include any official of 
their own nationality. Officials with none or only one same nationality contact add up 
to 87.7% of the sample. These indicators strongly indicate that task-related informal 
contacts are overwhelmingly supranational in the Commission, and that national 
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networks are a myth when it comes to asking for information and advice on task-
related issues in the Commission. 
Still, it is often argued that some nationalities have stronger reputation of 
national clubness (Hooghe 1999, 2001) or in the officials’ words, a much higher 
tendency to stick to each other even within this multinational environment (Officials 
#3, #7, #17, #26, #29, #69, #72, #116, #117, #120). The next question that has to be 
answered is: Are there really differences9 among nationalities when it comes to 
contacting own nationals? Figure 1 presents the network patterns per nationality. The 
results should be looked at with caution, however, due to the small size of officials 
per nationality in the sample. 
 
FIGURE 1 
AGGREGATED DISTRIBUTION OF SAME NATIONALITY CONTACTS PER NATIONALITY 
 
Nationality 
Ratio Contacts with Same 
Nationality: Total Contacts  
Percentage of  
Same Nationality Contacts 
Italy 7/20  35% 
France 10/30   33.3% 
United Kingdom 3/9 33.3% 
Belgium 6/20  30% 
Germany 10/39  25.6% 
Greece 4/21  19% 
Czech Republic 1/6  16.7% 
Ireland 1/9  11.1% 
Spain 1/15  6.7% 
Finland 0/15  0% 
Austria 0/12   0% 
Denmark 0/12  0% 
Sweden 0/9  0% 
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Netherlands 0/6  0% 
Portugal 0/3  0% 
Other 0/15 0% 
TOTAL  43/241  17.8% 
 
This figure indicates that contacts between compatriots, if at all, are a large member-
state phenomenon with officials from Italy, France, United Kingdom, Belgium10, and 
Germany having the most same nationality contacts. Officials see this, however, as a 
mere effect and automatic consequence of size of these member-state contingents 
(Officials #30, #31, #76). This observation is also reflected in the quantitative 
analysis. While the mode is “0” for both small and large member-states11, the median 
is “0” for small member-states and “1” for large-member-states. Even though large 
member-state officials have relatively more same nationality contacts, their networks 
are still predominantly supranational.   
The accounts of officials are supportive of these results: “There is not more 
contact with one nationality more than others. [...] Normally, the most part of 
colleagues who are here don’t think in national terms.” (Official #10) “Nationality is 
not a dominating factor in networks. Work-related networks are multinational.” 
(Official #52) Nationality does not matter for work (Official #117). A lot of it is 
perception (Official #105). 
Yet, five of the six nationalities which have no same nationality contacts are 
North European. Is the difference between the individualistic Northerners and the 
collectivistic Southerners reflected in the data? Do the Southern officials stick more 
than the Northern officials to their own region and nationality? Or are both groups 
homophilic (contacting more people from their own region) like the Council of 




The North-South Division: Another Myth?  
The successive enlargements of the EU have resulted in an increasing number of 
different nationalities. Arguably, as nationalities increased and spread out through the 
Commission, regional identities have become more relevant reference points for 
officials. In terms of cultural differences, the reference point “North-South” which had 
already been present at the time of the study of Abélès et al (1993), became even 
more established with the Northern enlargement in 1995. 
The relevance of the regional belonging category North-South was 
demonstrated in the interviews. Namely, 52.4% of the officials referred to the 
existence of a North-South division (the so-called “wine-belt vs. beer-belt division” by 
Official #50), especially while asked whether culture has any influence on the shape 
of networks within the Commission. Officials from the North and the South say they 
understand and communicate better with people from their own cultural region 
because they have the same mentality (Officials #9, #75, #78, #108). Northerners 
acknowledge that they would call other Northerners when they would like to directly 
go into the topic and receive a direct answer to the question they had in mind 
(Officials #9, #13, #42, #114). Southerners, on the other hand, feel that they can 
count on Northerners, obtain direct and reliable information from them (Official #53, 
#76), and appreciate the fact that Northerners are easy-going, open, and not 
hierarchical (Officials #53, #55, #59, #95).  
The perception of cultural differences with regard to the networking behavior 
of North and South European officials is clearly present. Northerners have the 
impression that the Southerners are better at networking than Northerners due to the 
negative connation of networking/lobbying in the North, but that they are catching up 
(Officials #38, #67, #111, #113, #114). To the contrary, Southerners have the 
impression that the concept of networking is itself Northern, but that Southerners, if 
by chance they find themselves in one maintain it better (Officials #22, #39, #58). 
The differences are also related to attitudes, i.e. introverted Northerners vs. 
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extraverted Southerners (Official #35), and to preferences with regard to working 
methods, i.e. Northerners opting for autonomous work, written communication (e-
mail) vs. Southerners willing to set up meetings and coffee breaks to enable face-to-
face talking (Officials #13, #55). Given the easiness of contacts due to these cultural 
common denominators (Official #52), some Northerners or Southerners admit that 
they sub-consciously have respectively more Northerners or Southerners in their 
network as a result (Officials #12, #47, #52, #92, #106).  Some even go as far as to 
argue that the Northern and Southern networks tend to be separate (Officials #75, 
#92). Are these perceptions reflected in the task-related informal networks of 
Commission officials or is this just another myth? Figure 2 displays the distribution of 
contacts within and across the Northern and Southern officials. 
 
FIGURE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL CONTACTS PER REGION (NORTH-SOUTH)12
Region North South TOTAL 
Same Region Contacts 53.2% 48.8% 118 
Different Region Contacts 46.8% 51.2% 114 
TOTAL 111 121 232 
 
Comparing North and South Europeans, the difference13 is very small between the 
two groups in terms of contacting other Northerners and Southerners. The results are 
contradictory to all expectations: There is neither an overall regional homophily 
(North with the North, South with the South), nor is homophily a tendency of the 
‘collectivistic’ Southerners. The contacts are almost evenly distributed between same 
and different region contacts, and if there is a group that prefers people of their own 
region to those of the others, it is the Northerners. The difference between the 
proportion of same region contacts of Northerners and Southerners is a mere 4.4% 
though.  
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In terms of contacting officials of the same nationality, however, the patterns 
of Northerners and Southerners are slightly different as Figure 3 shows:   
 
FIGURE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAME NATIONALITY CONTACTS PER REGION (NORTH-SOUTH) 
Region North South TOTAL 
Same Nationality Contacts 12.6% 23.1% 42 
Different Nationality Contacts 23.1% 76.9% 190 
TOTAL 111 121 232 
 
This time, it is the Southern officials who contact their own nationality more than the 
Northerners. The Southerners have a relatively stronger tendency to rely on 
compatriots: Southerners have twice the number of same nationality contacts as 
Northerners (28 vs. 14). In sum, the results of the bivariate analysis of the difference 
between North and South are mixed and call for a recheck in a multivariate analysis. 
 Some officials also tend to dismiss this North-South division calling it a 
prejudice (Official #82) that is often exaggerated (Official #73). It is a misconception, 
and the differences are rather in modality (the way Northerners and Southerners are 
perceived to network) and not in approaches (Official #105). As another official 
emphasizes, “Of course, people may be different if they come from the North or from 
the South…, but I don’t think that influences our work. No, I don’t see anything of 
that.” (Official #71)  
 
The Language Issue in a Multilingual Environment 
When asked whether nationality matters in terms of shaping networks, 46.3% of the 
officials claimed that it was language that mattered more. As the explanations of 
officials in the foregoing two sections also suggest, speaking the same native 
language is seen as an important door-opener (Officials #9, #80). After all, one can 
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only express and understand the nuances in one’s native language (Officials #80, 
#81). This ease in communication also creates trust (Official #69), which at times 
becomes vital: “Sometimes if you need sensitive background information, then it’s 
easier if you speak the same language.” (Official #81) 
It comes as no surprise in a Union with 23 official languages that officials tell 
anecdotes on misunderstandings due to language (Officials #46, #90, #95, #97) and 
emphasize to what extent it is important to make yourself understood in such a 
multilingual environment (Official #97). Yet, at the same time, Commission officials 
are champions of speaking foreign languages. The interviewed officials speak in 
average 3.63 languages, the maximum being six.  
The real question is to what extent the multiplicity of languages comes to life 
in the daily work of Commission officials. The Commission has three official working 
languages: English, French, and German. In practice, however, English and French 
are the languages which are daily used. The dominant language, however, has 
clearly shifted from French to English, a trend which has become even stronger with 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Most written documents are also increasingly 
first produced in English (Official #2). The diversity in languages is thus not reflected 
in daily practice. As one official explained, the larger the EU becomes and the more 
official languages have been added, the less number of languages are actually being 
used (Official #82).  
 The pre-dominance of English and the decline in the use of French is also 
echoed in the empirical data. Respondents were asked to indicate in which language 
they communicate with the three officials they chose as their most important 
contacts. The aggregated responses showed that 52.3% the exchanges were in 
English, 25.7% in French, 6.6% in German, and 5.4% in a mixture of English and 
French.14 Only in 32.8% of the cases do officials speak in their native language with 
contacts in their network.  
 21
Another issue that has been identified by the officials is whether one has 
English or French speaking networks (Officials #29, #73, #74, #90, #113, #117). 
This, however, is also not that much of a divide since Commission officials are very 
much accustomed to constantly shifting from English to French in their daily work 
(Official #92). More importantly, as one official also explained, when people are 
working on the same specific issue, there is no language barrier (Official #48). 
 
Explaining Networks in the Commission 
The foregoing empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that the homophily variables 
nationality, region, and language do not shape the task-related informal networks of 
Commission officials. How can this be explained? Plausibly, the effect of homophily 
may be weakened or annulled by other factors. Being forced to interact with people 
different from oneself may be one such factor (Cross and Parker 2004: 83-84). In the 
specific case of the Commission, officials might contact officials of different 
nationalities due to their socialization (prior to or during their time in the Commission); 
or they might be constrained in their willingness to contact their own nationals by 
organizational structures working against territorial clustering.  
These socialization and organizational variables that come to the fore in the 
EU literature have been tested in the following model to explain the choice of contact 
persons: 
 Control variable: Size of member-state to account for the lower/higher 
probability of contacts from small/large-member states due to the number of 
officials they have in the Commission 
 Independent variables: Testing for the homophily, socialization, and 
organizational variables. 
o North-South dummy – Retesting Hypothesis 2b in a multivariate 
equation.  
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o Experience in national administration – Testing prior national 
socialization: Officials who have previously worked at their home 
administration (who are socialized into defending national interests) 
are more likely to contact compatriots than officials who have no 
previous experience in national administration. 
o Number of spoken languages – Testing prior transnational 
socialization: The more languages an official speaks (the more 
affiliated an official is with other cultures), the less likely the official is 
to have same nationality contacts. 
o Tenure – Testing Commission Socialization: The longer officials 
work for the Commission (the more an official is used to working in a 
multinational environment), the less likely they will have same 
nationality contacts. 
o Number of within DG contacts – Testing organizational structure: 
Contacts within a DG are shaped primarily by functional requirements 
and are thus less likely to be shaped by nationality.  
 Dependent variable: Explaining the occurrence of same nationality contacts. 
 
To test for this the dependent variable same nationality contacts was 
dichotomized into the values 0 and 115 in order to run logistic regression. The choice 
for logistic regression results from the distribution of the responses: There is no 
normal distribution, and as aforementioned, 49 of the officials have zero same 
nationality contacts. The combination of these factors makes a linear regression 
analysis not a suitable choice. Logistic regression, however, accounts for a high 
number of zero responses when the dependent variable is dichotomous with the 
values 0 and 1. As such, logistic regression predicts the likelihood of the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of events in terms of odds (Pampel 2000: 11): “Odds express the 
likelihood of an occurrence relative to the likelihood of a non-occurrence.” 
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The dependent variable “number of same nationality contacts” has not been 
measured as a dichotomous variable which means that dichotomizing it leads to 
some loss of information. However, there were respectively 9 and 1 respondents with 
2 and 3 same nationality contacts, which meant that there was already not enough 
variance to be detected for a variable with four categories. Even though individuals 
with 1 and 3 nationality contacts may differ, this trade-off had to be made in order to 
be able to conduct a methodologically sound test. The SPSS output of the logistic 
regression including these variables is presented in Figure 4.16  
 
FIGURE 4 
EXPLAINING NETWORKS WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Independent Variables17 B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
Size of member-state** 2.205 .741 .003 9.069 
North-South dummy  .366 .613 .550 1.442 
Tenure .031 .040 .439 1.031 
Experience in national administration .343 .609 .574 1.409 
Number of spoken languages -.473 .321 .140 .623 
Number of within DG contacts* -.677 .307 .027 .508 
Constant .581 1.717 .735 1.788 
** p<0.01, *p<0.05                                                         Overall Percentage Correct: 73.3% 
N=75                                                                              Nagelkerke R Square: .389                 
 
The model performs quite well with correctly predicted cells at 73.3% and with 
a Nagelkerke R² of .389.18 Only two variables pass the significance test, namely 
those of size of member-state and the number of same DG contacts. In logistic 
regression, an odds ratio, i.e. exponentiated coefficient - Exp(B), higher than 1 
increases the odds of an event occurring and a coefficient smaller than 1 decreases 
the odds (Pampel 2000: 22). The control variable size of member-state has the 
highest coefficient, and it is positive. This means that it is far more likely to contact an 
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official of the same nationality if one belongs to a large nationality group. The 
coefficient of DG is relatively smaller, but it is smaller than 1 (negative) and 
significant: An official who has more within DG contacts is thus less likely to turn to 
compatriots. This implies that within DG contacts are less influenced by nationality 
compared to outside DG contacts which are more influenced by nationality.  
These results find support in the accounts of the interviewed officials. Size of 
a national group is indeed an important factor that determines whether an official can 
build a network with compatriots at all. The underlying reason for this is that 
Commission officials are specialized in specific files which in some cases require 
very specific technical or scientific expertise. Especially when you are an official from 
a small member-state, the chances are low that there is someone else from your 
nationality who is working in the same field of expertise (Officials #25, #100, #110, 
#116). Therefore, in practice nationality has limited effect because your nationality is 
not represented everywhere (Official #119). Furthermore, it would basically be not 
enough only to have a national network as a small member-state official (Official 
#67). In this sense, nationality potentially matters more for large member-state 
officials. It is not as if there is a choice between various persons in your field who all 
have the answer to a particular question. If that were the case, some officials 
admitted, they might choose the person from their own nationality over someone who 
is not (Official #95). But the chances of this hypothetical case are very low, and the 
exceptions are large member-states who have their officials almost in every unit 
(Official #106).  
That the DG is significant for the task-related informal networks of 
Commission officials is the reflection of the centrality of one’s field of expertise. When 
it comes to performing one’s tasks, the official’s specific file (dossier) is the most 
important consideration. As one official expresses: “[P]eople have their area of work 
that’s specified, so you really have to talk to them. Sometimes you can talk to one of 
their colleagues, but normally in the Commission people have quite specific 
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responsibilities.” (Official #13) Within this organizational context, expertise determines 
a contact person’s competence and utility. As a result, the policy issue one is working 
on “creates things that are in common” and “transcends the differences that might 
exist because of the main cultural differences” (Official #24). The words of a French 
official say it all:  
I don’t see nationality playing a role because what comes first is the function, the 
technical aspect. I am not going to ask for information on a file managed by a 
Swedish colleague to a French simply because he is French. He knows the subject. 
[…] It is the technical knowledge, the function, the fact of being responsible for a 
subject which comes first. [Author’s translation] (Official #91)  
The identification to one’s file (dossier) and expertise is so strong that there is little 
space left for general questions (Abélès and Bellier 1996: 437). The only kind of 
useful general information one can get from a fellow national tends to be on “how 
things work in another DG” (Officials #81, #113). Seeking out a compatriot comes 
also handy for finding out who is responsible (Officials #80, #81):  “It’s just a point of 
first contact, but they can tell you to whom you have to turn. And then nationality 
doesn’t play a role anymore.” (Official #81) Especially in such circumstances, it is 
easier to contact people in other DGs in your own language (Official #3). However, 
there are also officials who do not appreciate this “door-opener” function since it is 
not related to their expertise: “I don’t like someone who’s phoning, ‘I was just 
checking someone who’s Spanish on the list and wanted to ask you.’ To be Spanish, 
this is not a professional mark.” (Official #46)  
 The North-South division had given mixed results in the bivariate analysis, but 
in the multivariate analysis, this variable fails to pass the significance test. The 
socialization variables also fail, which is in line with previous quantitative research on 
socialization in the Commission (Hooghe 1999, 2001, 2005). Amongst the 
socialization variables, however, the prior transnational socialization variable number 
of spoken languages performs the best.  
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 Discussion and Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis of the empirical data on the networks of Commission officials 
demonstrates that national networks are indeed a myth when it comes to the 
substance of their work. This is not only supported by the sheer fact of numbers 
demonstrating that same nationality contacts are rather the exception than the rule, 
but also through the accounts of Commission officials stressing that “nationality is not 
a category that counts” in the Commission (Official #25), and that there is actually no 
need for advanced national networks (Official #31). Clearly, officials do not contact 
fellow nationals just because they come from the same country. By the virtue of their 
supranational networks, they fulfill their role of independent international civil 
servants as designed in the treaties.  
The analysis has also shown once more the significance of working with 
clearer concepts and the relevance of borrowing definitions and insights from other 
literatures; in this case from organizational and network theory for investigating 
“networks”. In particular, the deconstruction of the different types of networks has 
proven essential for analyzing networks in the Commission. This study was only the 
first step in terms of mapping out and explaining the networking behavior of 
Commission officials systematically. The career and leisure networks still ask for a 
systematic study.    
These results are in line with the results of a Commission survey in 1974, 
cited in Hans Michelmann’s article (1978). Michelmann reports that the survey found 
no statistically significant relationship between nationality and interaction (ibid: 492), 
and furthermore that the quality of interaction was also independent of nationality 
(ibid: 493). This leads Michelmann to conclude that “under normal circumstances 
officials react to fellow civil servants as individuals and not as members of national 
contingents” (idem). These conclusions hold for Commission officials interviewed 
three decades later.  
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The results also provide support for the organizational/institutional 
perspective on the study of EU institutions on a more generic level  (Egeberg 2001, 
2004, 2006a, 2006b; Trondal 2006a, 2006b). The extent to which the networking 
patterns of Commission officials are shaped (or constrained) by the organizational 
structure of the Commission demonstrated that the organizational belonging of 
officials influences their behavior. The contrast between the networking behavior of 
Council working group participants and Commission officials is a case in the point: 
The Council fora remain “after all a negotiation process among nations” (Beyers and 
Dierickx 1998: 313) whereas the Commission is where the European/supranational 
element visibly comes to life.  
There are also interesting parallels to be drawn between the results 
presented and previous research conducted on the College of Commissioners and 
their Cabinets. Egeberg’s research (2006a) had shown that the portfolio role was the 
most important factor in shaping decision-making behavior in the College. As to the 
effect of size of member-state, Joana and Smith (2004: 39) have previously argued 
that “Commissioners from large countries are most often in a position of comparative 
advantage because they and their cabinets are able to call upon networks of national 
actors when preparing arguments and objections on non-portfolio issues” (emphasize 
added). 
Like for the Commissioners and their Cabinets, the portfolio/dossier is the 
most important factor shaping the daily work of Commission officials. The extra 
information and advice they need to obtain in some cases falls on the borders or 
outside this portfolio, where they might turn to a compatriot. In such cases, coming 
from a large member-state might become advantageous since there are per default 
more contact points for any of these officials to turn to. 
The lessons to be drawn with regard to the effect of socialization are more 
ambiguous. Even though the results confirm those of Hooghe (1999, 2001, 2005) in 
terms of dismissing the role of socialization, the accounts of the Commission officials 
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interviewed for this study, as well as earlier research focusing on the identities of EU 
officials (Risse 2004) point to a different direction: Commission officials have 
internalized the values of the institution which is reflected in their daily behavior at 
work. The failure of socialization variables in quantitative analyses might thus be 
related to the fact that the indicators used for tapping into socialization are not 
powerful enough to capture this concept. In fact, the Commission attracts individuals 
with a highly cosmopolitan background, as the number of languages they speak also 
demonstrates. In this sense, I argue that self-selection plays a larger role than 
previously argued (Hooghe 2005). The Commission now recruits younger officials 
who have grown up in a globalized world whereas Hooghe’s research only focused 
on the earlier generation of senior Commission officials.  
This study has shown to what extent the Commission’s organizational 
structure shapes the networks of officials. This structure is obviously valid for the 
whole organization. Yet, the empirical data covered four social regulation DGs. It 
would be theoretically interesting to repeat it on a different group of DGs to see if 
different types of task requirements (e.g. being frequently in contact with other DGs) 
lead to different networking patterns. A focus on the top officials of the Commission, 
their Cabinets, or the Commissioners might also reveal whether the “political 
networks” are more likely to be shaped by nationality. Since these are all 
Commission actors bounded by the sectoral requirements, however, I do not expect 
their task-related networks to be affected by nationality either. In this sense, 
repeating the study in another EU institution or international organization such as the 
UN or WTO (World Trade Organization) would reveal whether the effect of nationality 
in a multinational organization can be managed through less focus on territorial 
concerns and more concern on functional considerations would be more interesting 
for testing for the effect organizational structure. Such an endeavor would be a step 
ahead for finding out how other multinational organizations achieve “unity in 
diversity”. 
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The Commission, however, seems to be free from the drawbacks of 
homophily, i.e. preventing a group from reaping the benefits of diversity and 
promoting us-vs.-them thinking (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 999), in terms of 
nationality. National networks in the Commission are a myth when it comes to 
performing their tasks. The ideal of civil servants “whose nationality [is] 
supranationality” (Quoted in Spence and Stevens 2006: 151) seems to be the 
everyday reality.  
 
                                          
Notes 
1 This dilemma has been termed previously as consociationalism vs. Weberianism by Liesbet Hooghe 
(1999) and as territorialization vs. autonomization by Morten Egeberg (2006b). 
2 Territorial subdivisions do, however, exist in some units of a few DGs. 
3 It remains to be seen how the Eastern enlargement has added an “East” category (Cyprus and Malta 
being the two exceptions which plausibly belong to the Southern group) to this classification or whether 
the new countries will on the long-term be included and/or integrated in the Northern or Southern 
groups. 
4 The networks of Commission officials with outside actors on the EU or member-state level are outside 
the scope of this study.  
5 The new EU staff regulation adopted in 2004 has changed the names of these officials to Administrator 
(AD). Yet, since Commission officials themselves still refer to the term “A-level”, this term will be 
employed in the rest of the paper. Note that the sample also includes permanent and temporary officials 
(seconded national experts and temporary agents) with policy-making functions. 
6 I rely on the classification Hooghe (2001) uses to group the DGs of the Commission into six policy 
areas: Administration, External Affairs, Market-Oriented, Social Regulation, Supply Side, and Provision. 
7 Two out of the 120 of the sampled officials were later excluded and not recontacted after the first letter 
asking for an interview when it became clear that they were not A-level officials. 
8 Social network scholars conducting research on ego-centered networks have asked their respondents 
to name three respondents (Cross, Borgatti and Parker 2001; Cross and Borgatti 2004). This is based 
on the finding that an average adult has 20 regular interlocutors, only three of which are confidants 
(Degenne and Forse 1999: 20-21).  
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9 Unfortunately, the differences cannot be tested for statistical significance since the data violates the 
basic assumptions of ANOVA, due to the skewed distribution of the sample, the unequal distribution of 
the cells, and the violation of the assumption of independence of observations in the aggregated data 
(See among others Field 2005: 324). 
10 Due to the location of the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium is also a large-member state in 
terms of the number of officials. 
11 Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and United Kingdom were coded as large member-states since 
these member-states based on the number of their A-level officials in the Commission. 
12 The East European officials (there were only two of them in the sample) and the officials with double 
nationality (that were a combination of North-South European) were excluded from the calculations. 
13 Similar to the case of the nationalities, the differences cannot be tested for statistical significance 
since the data violates the basic assumptions of ANOVA, due to the skewed distribution of the sample 
and the violation of the assumption of independence of observations in the aggregated data (See 
among others Field 2005: 324). 
14 The results should not suffer from a language bias since the respondents were given the choice 
between English and French for the language of the interview. 
15 Responses 1, 2, and 3 have been aggregated and recoded as 1. 
16 Collinearity diagnostics have shown that the variables do not suffer from multicollinearity problem. 
Residual analyses resulted in only two cases with standardized residual values around 3. 
17 The variables have been coded as follows:  
- Size of member-state: Small member-state=0 (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden), Large member-state=1 (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, 
UK) 
- North-South dummy: North= 0 (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK), South=1 (Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain)  
- Tenure: Number of years working for the Commission 
- Experience in national administration: No=1, Yes=1 
- Number of spoken languages: minimum 2, maximum 6 
- Number of within DG contacts: minimum 0, maximum 3 
18 It should be noted that the Nagelkerke R² Square tends to be lower than the corresponding linear 
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